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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,

1

Plaintiff-Respondent, i
t
V •

<

DOUGLAS R. ALBRETSEN,

ii

Case No. 880154

Category No. 2

Defendant-Appellant, i
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This appeal is from a judgment and conviction for
Aggravated Burglary, a first degree felony, in violation of Utah
Code Ann. § 76-6-203 (1978), and Theft, a second degree felony,
in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-404 (1978) in accordance
with Utah Code Ann. S 76-6-412(a)(i) (1978), in the Third
Judicial District Court.

This Court has jurisdiction to hear

this appeal under Utah Code Ann. S 78-2-2(3)(i) (Supp. 1988).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
1.

Whether the trial court properly admitted and

published defendant's "mug shot" photograph into evidence for the
purpose of rebutting defendant's challenge to the credibility of
the victim's identification?
2.

Whether the testimony of the State's rebuttal

witness to defendant's alibi was properly admitted when notice of
the witness and his potential testimony was given to defendant as
soon as was practicable?

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
Utah Code Ann- S 77-14-2 (1982):
77-14-2. Alibi—Notice requirements—WitneBB
lists. (1) A defendant, whether or not
written demand has been made, who intends to
offer evidence of an alibi shall, not less
than ten days before trial or at such other
time as the court may allow, file and serve
on the prosecuting attorney a notice, in
writing, of his intention to claim alibi.
The notice shall contain specific information
as to the place where the defendant claims to
have been at the time of the alleged offense
and, as particularly as is known to the
defendant or his attorney, the names and
addresses of the witnesses by whom he
proposes to establish alibi. The prosecuting
attorney, not more than five days after
receipt of the list provided herein or at
such other time as the court may direct,
shall file and serve the defendant with the
addresses, as particularly as are known to
him, of the witnesses the state proposes to
offer to contradict or impeach the
defendant's alibi evidence.
(2) The defendant and prosecuting
attorney shall be under a continuing duty to
disclose the names and addresses of
additional witnesses which come to the
attention of either party after filing their
alibi witness lists.
(3) If a defendant or prosecuting attorney
fails to comply with the requirements of this
section, the court may exclude evidence
offered to establish or rebut alibi.
However, the defendant may always testify on
his own behalf concerning alibi.
(4) The court may, for good cause shown,
waive the requirements of this section.
Utah R. Evid. 403s
Rule 403. Exclusion of relevant evidence on
grounds of prejudice, confusion, or waste of
time.
Although relevant, evidence may be
excluded if its probative value is
substantially outweighed by the danger of
unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or

misleading the jury, or by considerations of
undue delay, waste of time, or needless
presentation of cumulative evidence.
Utah R. Evid. 404(b);
(b) Other crimes, wrongs, or acts.
Evidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts is
not admissible to prove the character of a
person in order to show that he acted in
conformity therewith. It may, however, be
admissible for other purposes, such as proof
of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation,
plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of
mistake or accident.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant, Douglas R. Albretsen, was convicted of
Aggravated Burglary, a first degree felony, in violation of Utah
Code Ann. § 76-6-203 (1978), and Theft, a second degree felony,
in violation of Utah Code Ann. S 76-6-404 (1978), in accordance
with Utah Code Ann. S 76-6-412(a)(i) (1978), following a jury
trial held August 4 and 5, 1987, in the Third Judicial District
Court in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable
Raymond S. Uno, presiding.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On May 11, 1987, Maureen Leavitt returned home from
work at approximately 5:30-5:45 p.m. (T. 16). Leavitt, who has
20/20 vision, was feeling good, with no strains or worries, when
she arrived home that evening (T. 19). After entering the house,
Leavitt went into the family room in order to look into the yard
at"some recently-purchased flowers, pulled the drapes on the
windows in that room and then started down the hall that led to
the kitchen (T. 19-20).

As she approached the end of the

hallway, a man stepped from around the corner (T. 20). The man

was approximately two feet from Leavitt and he had a wooden club
raised in his hands (T. 21). The two of them looked at each
other face-to-face for approximately three seconds, then he
started to beat her with the club (T. 21-22).
The first hit knocked Leavitt to the floor (T. 22).
Although only semi-conscious, she continued to try to protect
herself by raising her hand in defense, but the attacker
continued to beat her until she finally lost consciousness (T.
23-24).

Leavitt suffered extensive injuries (T. 28-29) and was

hospitalized for two days (T. 35).
On May 14, 1987, Leavitt identified defendant as her
attacker from a black binder containing 30-50 photographs
provided by Detective Hutchison (T. 38-39).

Upon identifying

defendant's photo as that of her attacker, Leavitt stated to her
husband that:

"This looks like the man that beat me" (T. 39).

Subsequently, Detective Hutchison returned to Leavitt's
home with a photo display of six pictures (T. 39; State's Exhibit
8).

Leavitt immediately and positively identified a second, more

recent, picture of defendant as her attacker (T. 40, 56). At
defendant's request Leavitt also attended a line-up, where she
again identified defendant as her assailant (T. 42-43).
On July 22, 1987, defendant filed a Notice of Intent to
Rely on the Defense of Alibi as required by Utah Code Ann. S 7714^2(1) (1953, as amended) (R. 22). Brenda Davis and Cindy
Edwards were both listed as alibi witnesses (T. 22). The State
filed its Reply to Notice of Alibi on July 30, 1987 (R. 49-50).
Officer Brandt Hutchison of the Salt Lake City Police Department
was listed as State's rebuttal witness (R. 49).

On the first day of trial, defendant objected to
introduction of the loose-leaf binder of photographs and the
photo array used by Leavitt to identify him (R. 51). After some
discussion, the State agreed not to use the loose-leaf binder,
and agreed to alter the photo display as stipulated before
entering it as an exhibit (R. 51).
At trial, on direct examination Leavitt testified about
her identification of defendant as her attacker from the black
binder containing 30-50 photographs, and from the six-picture
photo display (T. 38-40).

Referring to the photo display, the

prosecutor asked Leavitt to place an "xM by the photograph which
she selected as her assailant for Detective Hutchison and then
moved for admission of the photo display as State's Exhibit 8 (T.
39-41).

Although defendant had no objection to the admission of

the exhibit, counsel requested and the court ruled that it not be
published at that time (R. 41).
On cross examination, defendant's attorney had Leavitt
repeat that when she identified defendant from the book of
pictures, she told her husband:

"This looks like the man that

beat meM (T. 54). Defendant's attorney then questioned Leavitt
about her subsequent identifications from the photo spread, the
line-up, the preliminary hearing, and at the present time of
trial, finally asking her to again repeat her initial statement
tocher husband that*

"This looks like the man that beat me" (T.

54^56).
On redirect examination Leavitt pointed out differences
between the first photo from the black binder and the second
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picture of defendant from the photo display (T. 56).
Specifically, she explained that the second photograph appeared
to be more recent (T. 56).
After requesting that the jury be excused, the
prosecutor moved for admission of the photo display as well as
the picture of defendant he had removed from the black binder and
altered to hide booking references (T. 67). Defendant objected
to the admission of the photograph from the binder on the grounds
that something had clearly been hidden from view and because the
photograph is a mug shot (T. 67). The State argued that the
photograph should be admitted for the specific purpose of
identity and to clarify Leavitt's initial statement that:

"This

looks like the man that beat me" (T. 69). Defendant did not
object to admission of the six-picture photo array.

The court

admitted the photo from the black binder, State's Exhibit 9, for
purposes of identification (T. 70-71).

The two exhibits were

later published to the jury (T. 74). Defendant moved for a
mistrial based on the admission of Exhibit 9 and the Court denied
the motion (T. 79, 81).
Defendant called Brenda Davis as an alibi witness (T.
82).

On May 27, 1987, prior to trial, Detective Hutchison

contacted Brenda Davis and obtained a handwritten statement from
Davis that claimed defendant was with her at the time of the
crime (R. 213, 225, copy in Addendum).

In part, Davis wrote that

they had "gone up into the mountain for a ride, into [sic]
Parlsey [sic] Way and Emingation [sic] Canyan [sic]H (R. 225).
(Addendum A.) At trial, during cross examination, Davis more
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fully described the route that she and defendant had taken
through the canyons (T. 96). She stated that they first
travelled up Parley's Way to the East Canyon turnoff (T. 96).
From there they travelled over the mountain and came back down
Emigration Canyon (R. 96-97).

The State repeated the route given

by Davis and again asked if she was sure that that was where they
had driven# which she affirmed (T. 97).
After the defense rested, the prosecutor informed the
Court that he anticipated some rebuttal and requested a recess in
order to locate a witness (T. 114). After approximately 15-20
minutes, the witness had not been located and defendant moved
that evidence be closed (T. 115). The prosecutor further
explained that after talking with a police officer who had given
him a lead, he intended to call Richard Miller of the Utah
Department of Transportation, who he believed would testify that
the route given by Brenda Davis was unavailable on May 11, 1987
(T. 117-18).

The court denied defendant's motion to close the

evidence and took its noon recess (T. 119). Mr. Miller
testified, over defendant's objection, that from April 13th to
June 17th# 1987, SR-65, the only road between Parley's Way and
Emigration Canyon was closed and unnavigable (T. 124-129).
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The trial court properly admitted and published into
evidence the photograph of defendant that had been used by the
victim, Maureen Leavitt, to initially identify defendant as her
attacker.

This photograph had substantial probative value in

rebutting defendant's theory that Leavitt'8 statement upon seeing

the photograph:

"This looks like the man that beat me" could be

interpreted to mean that her initial identification was
unreliable and subsequent positive and immediate identifications
of defendant were linked to the initial photograph and not to the
attack.

It was necessary for the jury to see the photograph so

that they could determine that the actual reason for Leavitt's
statement was due to the fact that the photograph showed a
younger picture of defendant than at the time Leavitt came upon
him in her hallway.

Thus, under Rules 403 and 404(b) of the Utah

Rules of Evidence, admission of the photograph into evidence was
proper.
Secondly, the court properly allowed the State to
locate and offer rebuttal testimony to discredit a statement made
by one of defendant's alibi witnesses.

Until this witness

testified on cross examination the State had no idea of the
usefulness of such rebuttal testimony.

The State notified

defendant of the witness and his potential testimony as soon as
was practicable, thus no violation of Utah Code Ann. S 77-14-2
(1982) occurred.

Additionally, although defendant knew of the

possibility of requesting a continuance in such circumstances, he
failed to do so apparently because he felt that the testimony was
not crucial.

Defendant should not now be able to claim that such

testimony is reversible error.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY ADMITTED DEFENDANT'S
PHOTOGRAPH.
A. Admission Of The Photograph Was Proper
Because It Established Defendant's Identity.
The State agrees with defendant that this Court has
consistently excluded evidence of prior crimes when the relevance
of such acts to the matter at hand is overcome by the prejudicial
effect that such evidence may have on the jury.

See e.g., State

v. Pacheco, 712 P.2d 192 (Utah 1985), cert, denied, 479 U.S. 813
(1986) (evidence of other crimes admissible to prove a specific
element of present alleged crime; inadmissible simply to show
criminal propensity); State v. Saunders, 699 P.2d 738 (Utah 1985)
(evidence of prior crimes inadmissible unless reason other than
to show criminal disposition); State v. Holder, 694 P.2d 583
(Utah 1984) (evidence of another crime must be used with extreme
caution because of potential prejudicial effect); and State v.
McCumber, 622 P.2d 353 (Utah 1980) (evidence of prior convictions
could come before jury under the limited purpose to challenge the
credibility if defendant testified).

In fact, Justice

Zimmerman's concurring opinion in State v. Bishop, 753 P.2d 439
(Utah 1988) explains:
This Court's decisions have consistently
recognized that an accused is almost
certainly prejudiced unfairly when evidence
of unrelated crimes or bad acts is introduced
because of "the tendency of a fact finder to
convict the accused because of bad character
rather than because he [or she] is shown to
be guilty of the offenses charged." [quoting
from Saunders at 741]. • .M "such evidence
is presumed prejudicial and, absent a reason

for the admission of the evidence other than
to show criminal disposition, the evidence is
excluded.11 Id.
Bishop/ at 496.
Nevertheless, certain reasons may overcome the
prejudicial presumption and evidence of prior crimes or bad acts
may be admissible.

Rule 403 of the Utah Rules of Evidence (1983)

provides:
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded
if its probative value is substantially
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice,
confusion of the issues, or misleading the
jury, or by considerations of undue delay,
waste of time, or needless preservation of
cumulative evidence.
Conversely, if the probative value of the evidence outweighs any
possible prejudice, the evidence is admissible.

Rule 404(b) of

the Utah Rules of Evidence (1983) directs:
Evidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts is
not admissible to prove the character of a
person in order to show that he acted in
conformity therewith. It may, however, be
admissible for other purposes, such as proof
of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation,
plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of
mistake or action.
Admission of the photograph in the case at hand does not violate
Rule 403 and existing case law.

The photograph objected to in

this case was not offered to show the criminal disposition of
defendant nor to prejudice the jury.

Its purpose was to rebut

defendant's strategic implications that Leavitt's initial
identification was uncertain and that her subsequent selection of
defendant as her attacker from the photo display, the line-up,
the preliminary hearing, and the trial in question resulted from
repeated confrontations with defendant's photo or person rather

than from her memory of her attacker.

Even assuming that the

photograph might have been considered evidence of a prior
conviction its use for purposes of identity falls directly within
the exception of the Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 404(b).

Any

prejudicial effect of the photograph was greatly outweighed by
its probative value to place in context Leavitt's initial
identification of defendant as her assailant.
When the State, outside the presence of the jury,
proposed the admission of the photograph of defendant which had
been removed from the black binder of 30-50 photographs initially
used by Leavitt in identifying defendant as her attacker, defense
counsel stated:
Our question in the case is that when in fact
she picked that picture, she was not certain,
but as she saw more and more pictures or
personal appearances by Mr. Albretsen, it
became cemented in her mind. It's common
sense that would be our position from the
questions we have asked. To bring this
picture in is unnecessary and prejudicial.
(T. 68).
It was precisely for the reasons stated by defendant
that the photograph's probative value outweighs any possible
prejudice.

Defendant interpreted Leavitt's statement that:

-This looks like the man that beat me" (T. 39) at the time she
picked defendant's photo from the binder as meaning that Leavitt
"had an impression that caused her to pick a picture tentatively,
and she has become convinced over time, so she's mistaken"
(defendant's closing argument, (T. 163)).

The State argued that

Leavitt's statement to her husband was explained by the fact that
it was not a recent picture, and that the difference between the
-11-

photographic representation of defendant which Leavitt identified
and the real-life attacker in her hallway which she subsequently
reidentified as defendant in a variety of settings would
logically elicit the statement that:
that beat me."

"This looks like the man

Such a question of semantic interpretation could

only be settled by the jury with the aid of the photo so heavily
questioned by defendant.
As defendant suggests, this Court has not yet
determined that specific issue of this case; i.e. whether "mug
shots" are admissible to corroborate identification testimony.
However, Utah decisions have closely approached the matter.

In a

forgery prosecution, State v. Owens, 388 P.2d 797 (Utah 1964), a
grocery store manager testified on direct examination that the
defendant had cashed a money order at the store.

Defense counsel

casted doubt on the witness' perceptive abilities.

On redirect

examination, the prosecutor elicited from the manager the fact
that within two or three days of the crime, he picked the
defendant's picture from a group of mug shots.

The defendant's

photo, along with the others, was introduced into evidence
without any objection.

On appeal, the defendant argued that the

only issue in the case was identification.

Since the manager had

identified the defendant in court on direct, so the argument ran,
the testimony about the mug shots was unnecessary and could only
carry the implication that the defendant associated with
criminals, and thus prejudiced him in the minds of the jury.
This Court held that*
evidence.

"The pictures were offered and received in

No objection was made to any of this testimony nor to

the receipt in evidence of the pictures.

However, under the

facts of this case we are of the opinion that such evidence was
admissible on the issue of identification."

Id. at 798 (footnote

omitted).
As defendant points out, cases such as People v.
Aguirre, 158 Cal.App.2d 304, 322 P.2d 478 (1958) and People v.
Gould, 54 Cal.2d 621, 7 Cal.Rptr. 273, 354 P.2d 865 (1960), upon
which the Owens court relied, stand for the general proposition
that extra-judicial identification is admissible to corroborate
identification or to serve as independent evidence of
identification.

See Gould, 354 P.2d at 867. However, there is

no reason that Owens should be limited to a reading that only
testimony about such corroborative or independent identification
is allowed.

Equally unpersuasive is defendant's argument that

Owens be narrowly limited because subsequent cases such as State
v. Jiron, 492 P.2d 983 (Utah 1972) in which Owens was cited,
interpreted Owens as holding that "the testimony of a witness as
to his extra-judicial identification of a defendant was
admissible.

Jiron, at 984.

Since the issue in Jiron was

specifically whether the testimony about extra-judicial
idenfication was properly admitted, there was no need to expound
upon Owens beyond the point necessary to rule on the specific
issue in Jiron.

Admission of the actual photographs was not an

iasue in Jiron.
Several other jurisdictions have resolved the question
of whether photographs, specifically "mug shots," may be admitted
for identification purposes.

In People v. Travier# 197 N.W.2d
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890 (Mich. App. 1972), a defendant claimed that it was
prejudicial to allow the jury to see his mug shot.

The Court of

Appeals of Michigan held:
it would be better if the jury was not
allowed to see mug shots of the defendant.
However, where, as here, defense counsel has
made an issue of the witness's ability to
recognize the defendant from the picture he
was shown by the police, it was not improper
for the trial court to admit the photos
. . . . The court did its best to disguise
the portions of the pictures making them
recognizable as mug shots. We find no error
in the admission of the exhibits. . . .
Travier, at 892 (citation omitted).

Similary, defendant here

suggested that Leavitt had "difficulties with identification" (T.
151) which was revealed in her statement:

"This looks like the

man that beat me" (T. 39). Therefore, the photograph was
necessary to show that it was an outdated but identifiable
likeness of defendant and thus substantiate her initial
identification.

The jury could not decide whether Leavitt's

identification of defendant was faulty without viewing the
photographs she used to identify him.

By raising the* issue

himself, defendant invited the State's rebuttal offer of the
photos.

The trial judge properly allowed the State to

rehabilitate its witness by explaining the circumstances of her
identification.
In the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit, a defendant claimed that the admission of his Mmug shot"
iiv conjunction with the testimony of an identification witness
was prejudicial error.

United States v. Johnson, 495 F.2d 378

(4th Cir. 1974), cert, denied, 419 U.S. 860 (1974).
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The court

noted that the photograph had been taped over and the jury was
instructed to draw no inferences therefrom, and then held that
because the photo "had legitimate probative relevance to
demonstrate the difference in Lee's appearance at the time of
trial as compared to the time of a prior photographic
identification" it was admissible,

^d. at 384.

Further, in People v. Byrd, 357 N.E.2d 174 (111. App.
1976), the defendant claimed that the trial court erred in
admitting a "mug shot" and allowing the jury to take it into the
jury room during deliberations.

The court's description of that

case could be easily substituted for this one:
The central issue at the trial was the
accuracy of the defendant's identification.
His counsel attempted to cast doubt upon this
identification in every way he could. One of
the ways he tried to do so was to show that
Latimore hesitated when first shown the
picture. Latimore's explanation for the
hesitation was that there was a difference
between Byrd's appearance in the 1969 picture
and his appearance at the time of the crimes
and at the trial. Whether this was so became
an issue at the trial. Its importance was
emphasized in the final arguments of both
sides. • • •

Here the issue was whether Latimore's failure
to quickly and positively identify Byrd as
the third assailant from the 2-year old
photograph destroyed or injured the
credibility of his later lineup and in-court
identifications. The photograph was relevant
to this issue and the court correctly
received it in evidence. And given the
importance of the issue which confronted the
jury, the court ruled correctly in allowing
it to view the photograph.
Id. at 178.
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Lastly, in Irby v. Statef 429 So.2d 1179 (Ala. Crim.
App. 1983), the court rejected a claim that admission of a "mug
shot" was reversible error.

The questioned photograph originated

from a group of pictures shown to the witness which resulted in
the initial identification.

Because the defendant attempted to

impeach the witness's identification, the court admitted the
photograph "to verify Witness Epp's prior out-of-court
identification and to strengthen and corroborate her testimony
and in-court identification."

Ici. at 1183. Additionally, the

court noted that where the defense is alibi (as it was in this
case), identification is a material issue and a photograph shown
by police officers to the victim or witness who identified him is
admissible.

Id.

Defendant claims that in light of Leavitt's in-court
identification of defendant as her attacker, admission of the
photograph was cumulative and precluded under Rule 403 and Rule
404(b) of the Utah Rules of Evidence.
13).

(Defendant's brief at 12-

However, upon close examination, defendant's two supporting

cases are distinguishable.

In Commonwealth v. Troweryf 235 A,2d

171 (Pa.Super. 1967), the Superior Court of Pennsylvania
determined that the admission of a "rogues gallery photograph"
into evidence for the purpose of identification was reversible
error.

Yet it appears that the photograph in Trowery was offered

in-the State's case-in-chief to establish identity with no
indication that there was an alibi defense or an attempt by the
defendant to discredit the witness's identification, as occurred
in this case.
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Similarly, in State v, Kutzen, 620 P.2d 258 (Hawaii Ct.
App. 1980), the court found that the photographs "were introduced
not to rebut any inferences of unreliability as to Gunderson's
identification of appellants, but to simply establish his
pretrial identification of her as part of the prosecution's casein-chief.

Indeed, the admission of the photographs into evidence

after Gunderson made an unequivocal in-court identification of
appellants was unnecessary."

Id. at 263.

Implicit in this

statement is that if the photos had been introduced to rebut
inferences of reliability as to the identification, the court
would have allowed their admission.

It is exactly for this

reason that the photographs were introduced in this case. Thus#
the ruling in Kutzen is at least distinguishable, if not
favorable to the State's position.
The photograph here was not merely cumulative evidence
of identification, used to establish guilt, or produced to
tarnish the jury's perception of defendant.

Rather, it was

highly probative to explain Leavitt's reaction when she initially
identified defendant as her attacker and to rebut defendant's
theory that subsequent identifications were linked to the initial
photo instead of the actual attacker.

Thus, any possible

prejudice from the photograph's admission into evidence did not
substantially outweigh its probative value and the trial court's
admission of the evidence should be affirmed.
Finally, defendant did not object to admission of the
photo array, Exhibit 8, once it was masked with tape to cover any
booking references, of the persons involved (R. 51; T. 41).
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Exhibit 9 is similarly masked.

Moreover, Leavitt had already

testified, and defendant had emphasized, that she identified her
attacker from a binder of photographs provided to her by the
investigating officer three days after the crime.

If the jury

was likely to infer that defendant's photo was a "mug shot" and
evidence of prior crimes or bad acts, they were just as likely to
do so from the testimony as they were from actually viewing the
photograph. Thus, even if it was error to admit the actual photo,
it was harmless.

This is especially true where defendant

strategically chose to emphasize Leavitt#s identification and the
process surrounding it.
B. Procedures Used By The Trial Court To
Minimize Any Possible Prejudicial Effect Of
The Photograph Were Proper And Effective.
Although the trial court excluded the black binder of
30-50 photographs from evidence (R. 51), subsequent events during
trial necessitated admission of the photograph from the binder
from which Leavitt initially identified defendant by her words:
w

This looks like the man that beat me" (T. 39). In a hearing

outside the presence of the jury, the State proffered the
questioned photograph, Exhibit 9, which had been taped over to
conceal any evidence of prior convictions or bad acts and
proposed that it be admitted into evidence (T. 67). Argument
ensued concerning the nature of the picture as a "mug shot" and
the possible prejudice that its admission could cause (T. 67-72)•
The court admitted the photograph, noting that the photo display
of six pictures which were of the same nature had already been
admitted [without objection to the taping over the bottom of the

pictures or the origin of the photographs] (T. 72). In fact,
during defendant's objections to the admission of the photograph
from the black binder, defendant described the case as one "that
has been relatively clean where there as been no prejudicial
error" and then proceeded to argue that the questioned "mug shot"
should not be admitted because of prejudice, although the other
photographs were not considered prejudicial error (T. 69).
It should be noted again that the photograph was highly
probative.

The State's actions in limiting possible prejudice by

removing the photograph from the binder, covering any booking
information that may have appeared on the photograph, and moving
for its admission only after requesting that the jury be excused,
should not be construed as an attempt to discredit or prejudice
defendant, but as a commendable effort to do all in its power to
limit the jury's attention to the possibly prejudicial nature of
the photograph.
Although this Court has not specifically determined
what measures should be taken to prepare a "mug shot" that must
be admitted into evidence because of its high probative value,
State v. McCardell, 652 P.2d 942 (Utah 1982) states that "if
McCardell had made his specific objection concerning the
information on the back of [the "mug shot"] known to the trial
court, the court could have rejected all five individual
photographs and admitted only the group photo, or taken steps to
cover or remove the information on the back of exhibit 10 so as
to ensure that it would not be available for the jury's
inadvertent discovery" (emphasis added).

JId. at 947.

Courts from several other jurisdictions have directly
ruled on this issue.

In United States v. De Sena# 490 F.2d 692

(2nd Cir. 1973), "mug shots" were introduced following testimony
about a prior photographic identification.

The Court noted that

such evidence may undermine a defendant's right to a fair trial
in certain circumstances, but concluded that because the bottoms
of the pictures had been taped over with the word "evidence"
written on the tape, the taping was performed outside the
presence of the jury, and the pictures were not introduced in a
prejudicial manner, there was no error requiring reversal.
The editing of the photograph in this case equals that
in De Sena.

Additionally, it was introduced to rebut defendant's

inferences on cross examination that Ms. Leavitt's identification
was tainted by viewing this very photograph.
The Supreme Court of North Carolina, in State v.
Fulcher, 243 S.E.2d 338 (N.C. 1978), also determined that
admission of five pairs of photographs used during the pre-arrest
identification process which depicted front and side views of the
defendant and four others, from which prison numbers had been
removed but in which chains around the subjects' necks remained
visible, was not prejudicial error where the defendant had
challenged the propriety of the pre-arrest identification
process.

Although the question went to the propriety of the

process used in that case rather than to its reliability, the
court determined that, even though the jury could infer that the
defendant had had prior criminal contact with the police from the
cropped photos, their probative value was sufficient to outweigh

any potential prejudice.

This reasoning is also persuasive in

this case where the photo display had already been admitted
without objection, the questioned photograph did not leave telltale signs such as a visible chain around defendant's neck, and
the need for its admission was equally probative.
In Walker v. State, 473 So.2d 694 (Fla.App. 1 Dist.
1985), remanded on other grounds, Walker v. State, 499 So.2d 884
(1986) the defendant also challenged the admission of photographs
showing frontal and profile views which had been sued for pretrial identification.

The court noted that "[t]he photographs

were taped so that dates and numbers were 'cropped out,' and the
photographs made no explicit reference to prior criminal
activity, . . . " and then affirmed their admission.

Ici. at 698.

Other courts have also allowed photographic evidence of
defendants although the picture displays a frontal and profile
view.

See e.g. Reiger v. Christensen, 789 F.2d 1425 (9th Cir.

1985) (although it may have been preferable to separate the
frontal and profile views, where the photographs bore no markings
which would identify them with police files, they were
admissible); Commonwealth v. Weichell, 453 N.E.2d 1038 (Mass.
1983) (where trial judge used every other reasonable means to
eliminate prejudice, failure to separate frontal and profile
views of mug shot was not prejudicial error); and Futrell v.
Wyrick, 716 F.2d 1207 (8th Cir. 1983) (failure to separate poses
orr mug shot that was introduced into evidence did not amount to
prejudicial error).

Similarly, in the present case, the

photograph consisted of a frontal and profile view; however, all
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references to any police contact were covered, no suggestion was
made before the jury that the photograph was a "mug shot", and
there was significant probative value for its inclusion.
Defendant asserts that several cases condemn mug shots
as inherently prejudicial and that attempts to mask or otherwise
edit matter that might link the photograph to prior criminal
contact are futile or even counter-productive.

However, a close

reading reveals the more specific bases of prejudice in these
cases.

Barnes v. United States, 365 F.2d 509 (D.C. Cir. 1966),

cited by defendant, states that w[t]he rudimentary tape cover . .
. neither disguised the nature of the picture nor avoided the
prejudice. . . ." Ici. at 511.

But the court further reveals that

the tape was placed on the picture after it was shown to the
witness in the presence of the jury, after defense counsel had
objected to its introduction, also in the presence of the jury,
and only following a short conference at the bench was the tape
affixed and the photograph admitted so that the judge could have
"a chance to try it out, so that the Court of Appeals can rule."
Id. at 510. Additionally, the Barnes court relied on an Indiana
case in which a similar exhibit was not allowed because it had
little or no probative value. Id. at 511, citing Vaughn v. State,
215 Ind. 142, 19 N.E.2d 239, 241 (1939).
The present case differs in several important respects
from Barnes and Vaughn.

The photograph was probative to rebut

defendant's implications of a faulty identification, the covering
was not rudimentary, nor was it shown to the witness before it
was masked, discussions about its admissibility were held out of

the jury's presence and it was admitted in a manner that did not
arouse the suspicion of the jury.

Although cases such as People

v. Buqarin, 507 P.2d 879 (Colo. 1973) criticize the use of mug
shots regardless of efforts to remove references to prior
criminal dealings, no discussion is devoted to situations such as
the case at hand in which the defendant's strategy greatly
increases the probative value of the photograph.

Such a general

presumption of prejudice should not preclude the introduction of
mug shots under the circumstances at hand.
Richardson v. Statef 536 S.W.2d 221 (Tex. Crim. 1976)
was reversed because the trial judge determined that there was no
way to disguise a mug shot, so he allowed the photograph into
evidence with all markings visibly displayed.

The appeals court

pointed out that mug shots, nonetheless, had been introduced
without error in Texas cases where no objection was made, and
also where prejudicial identification had been effectively
removed. JId. at 223.

Because prejudicial identification was

successfully removed in this case as well, it is distinguishable
from Richardson.
Also, in People v. Carroll, 61 A.D.2d 760, 402 N.Y.S.2d
8 (1978) although the court stated that the taping over of the
prison numerals on the defendant's chest in that mug shot may
have emphasized the photo's nature, it also stated that had it
been properly redacted, the photo may have been probative. Id. at
8-3.

The court there did not specify what proper redaction

entails.

The other cases cited above, however, indicate that the

editing of the photographs in this case was sufficient.

Finally, in People v. Clark, 297 N.E.2d 395 (111. App.
1973) the mug shot was not sufficiently disguised to conceal all
writing which connected the defendant with his prior criminal
history.

On one pose something had been blocked out and on the

other lettering remained.

Arguably it was this insufficient

editing which "could only lead the jury to speculate as to what
information the deleted portion of the photograph had contained,"
and the court's opinion should not be expanded to require
exclusion of all edited photos.
Defendant's final contention that the masking was used
in order to suggest that the photograph was taken incident to the
current offense (defendant's brief at 17) is not well-taken.

The

photo originated from a black binder already in the possession of
the police and, as was testified by Leavitt, was used for initial
identification (T. 38). From the fact that the origin of the
photograph was mentioned early in the trial, without objection, a
sophisticated juror may have already presumed that the defendant
had had previous contact with the police in order for them to
have his picture.

The admission of the photograph added very

little to the information already possessed by the jury about the
possibility that defendant had previously encountered
difficulties with law enforcement.

In any event, the

photograph's possible inferential prejudicial effect was
substantially less than its probative value.

C. ADMISSION OF THE PHOTOGRAPH USED BY
LEAVITT FOR INITIAL IDENTIFICATION PURPOSES
WAS NOT PREJUDICIAL ERROR, IF IT WAS ERROR.
Even if it is possible that the jury's perception of
defendant may have been that he was previously known to law
enforcement officials, it is unlikely that this perception
contributed to their decision in this case.

The admission of the

photograph used by Leavitt in her initial identification of her
attacker was not directed at this perception, but rather
presented to rebut defendant's implications that Leavitt's
identification of him as her assailant was keyed to the
photograph and not the attack.

When Leavitt made the statement

"This looks like the man that beat me" (T. 39) she did so because
the photograph that she saw was not recent, not because she could
not positively identify the man in her home that she looked at
face to face for three seconds before he began his attack (T. 21,
56, 169-171).
That the admission of the photograph does affect the
credibility of defendant's alibi does not make its admission
error.

The State is not prevented from attacking the credibility

of the alibi a defendant offers.

In fact, the alibi defense

suggests that the victim's identification is mistaken and raises
the issue of her credibility, thus making the photograph highly
probative to the issue of identity and, therefore, admissible.
Defendant further suggests that the State failed to
mtffet the two criteria of State v. Harrington, 490 F.2d 487 (2d
Cir. 1973) that (1) no prior criminal record must be implied by
the photographs, and (2) the jury's attention should not be drawn
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to the source or implications of the photographs by the manner in
which they are introduced.
controlling, they were met.

Although these criteria are not
Unlike the picture in Johnson v.

Commonwealth, 345 S.E.2d 303 (Va. App. 1986), in which the mug
shot's legend was visible, the legend on the photograph here was
masked and there were no implications of any prior convictions of
the defendant.

Thus, the first prong was satisfied.

Additionally, when the photograph was introduced, questioning was
limited to foundation, specifically tailored only to identify the
photograph, as was requested by defendant and ordered by the
court (T. 72, 73). No reference was made to the photograph as a
"mug shot", as was found to be error in State v. Moore, 495 P.2d
445 (Ariz. 1972), no argument on admissibility was heard by the
jury, and the photograph was admitted and published with as
little fanfare as other exhibits in the case.
The probative value of the photograph substantially
outweighed its potential for prejudice in this case, and thus, in
accordance with Rule 403 its admission was not reversible error.
POINT II
THE TESTIMONY OF RICHARD MILLER WAS PROPERLY
ADMITTED AS REBUTTAL EVIDENCE AND DID NOT
DENY DEFENDANT DUE PROCESS.
Prior to trial, on May 27, 1987, Detective Hutchison
contacted Brenda Davis, with whom defendant was living at the
time of the offense, and obtained a handwritten statement in
which Davis claimed to be with defendant at the time of the crime
(R. 2313. 225, Addendum).

In part, Davis wrote that they had

"gone up into the mountains for a ride, into to [sic] Parlsey

-2fi-

[sic] Way and Emingation [sic] Canyan [sic].M (R. 225, Addendum).
When defendant questioned Davis concerning where she and
defendant had gone after she picked her son up from school, she
simply stated, "we went for a ride up into Parley's Way and
Immigration [sic] Canyon*1 (T. 86). On cross examination/ the
State questioned Davis in greater depth in several areas.

The

State inquired as to the real relationship between Davis and
defendant (T. 92-93) and questioned the time frame between the
end of her relationship with defendant and the beginning of a new
live-in relationship (T. 94). The sequence of events of May 11,
was precisely established (T. 95). Then, the State questioned
Davis concerning the exact route taken by her and defendant as
they left her mother's shop and travelled into the canyons (T.
96-97).

Next, the State asked Davis to specify what she had

eaten for lunch that day# and what she ate the next week—both of
which she remembered with precision (T. 97-98).

And the

questioning continued in detail concerning the rest of the day's
travels, the invitation given to her friend to come by for
dinner, and the reasons for the bicycle ride to her friend's home
(T. 98-100).

Following this specific questioning, the State

inquired:
Q. Is everything you told us the truth today?
A. Yes, it is.
Q. Every last thing?
A. Yes, it is.
Q. Every part of it?
A. Yes.
Q. You're confident and sure that's what happened?
A. I am positive.
(T. 101).

Davis testified next that she told Detective Hutchison that she
loved defendant and that she was going to help him in e*very way
she could.

The purpose for this extensive and detailed

questioning was to discredit Davis's alibi testimony by showing
that her feelings for defendant affected her credibility/ that
her testimony was too precise to be believable, or by eliciting
enough specificity that another alibi witness or a rebuttal
witness could contradict her testimony.

The State's suspicion of

Davis's credibility is evidenced in a later statement made by the
prosecutor in the judge's chambers following the noon recess that
"The police talked to that witness and had a statement that is in
verbatim what she testified to on the stand" (T. 124). The State
did know before trial, then, that it was going to attempt to
discredit Davis; but did not, as defendant suggests, hide
rebuttal testimony and set the stage for a surprise witness.
Rather Davis's credibility was suspect, and all avenues were
being explored for the purpose of discrediting her.

Until Davis

took the stand and described the exact route, the State did not
know that she would necessarily be discreditable.

Apparently,

the prosecutor was not aware that the route was possibly
inaccessible until someone suggested it to him during trial.
Had the State been prepared with a surprise witness as
defendant suggests, it seems logical that it would not have
required from 11:15 a.m. to 1*45 p.m. to locate and bring the
witness into the courtroom (T. 115-119).

In fact, the State

explained to the court the manner in which the witness was
procured, "Your Honor, the defense finished with their two

rebuttal witnesses approximately 15 minutes ago.

Since that time

I talked with my police officer who gave me a lead as to a person
we want to use as a rebuttal, a Mr. Miller, who works for the
Department of Transportation" (T. 115). This dialogue reveals
that the rebuttal witness was not planned and hidden, but
suddenly discovered.

Even when the prosecutor reported to

defendant that he believed the witness would testify that the
route said to have been taken by Davis was closed to travel at
the time, there was still uncertainty as to Miller's exact
testimony (T. 117). There is no evidence that the prosecutors
knew for certain that the road Davis claimed to have travelled
was closed, only that the prosecutor suspected that it was
closed.
Defendant cites Wardius v. Oregon, 412 U.S. 470 (1973)
for the proposition that M[t]he State may not insist that trials
be run as a 'search for truth' so far as defense witnesses are
concerned, while maintaining 'poker game' secrecy for its own
witnesses.*1 ^d. at 475. However, in People v. Gillman, 239
N.W.2d 396, 400 (Mich. App. 1976) the Court of Appeals of
Michigan stated, "we do not believe that the Wardius case was
intended to apply to prosecution witnesses called only for the
purpose of impeaching an alibi witness's credibility."
rationale behind this statement is:
Now, if the people had somebody who was
going to testify that they saw the defendant
at a different place or at the scene of the
crime, then I think they have a duty to
notify the defendant of that after an alibi
is placed on the record.
•

• •
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The

Now, the question here is whether or not
somebody can testify to rebut the witnesses'
story to show that perhaps they aren't
credible rather than place the defendant at
the scene at the time. . . .
Gillman at 399.

The court basically found a difference between a

rebuttal witness that would directly refute the alibi and was
required to be discovered and a rebuttal witness used solely to
discredit the alibi testimony.
This same reasoning was applied in Williams v. State,
437 A.2d 665 (Md. App. 1982).

In that case, the defendant's

alibi was that he had been at his girlfriend's apartment from
11:00 p.m. until the next morning, and the murder occurred at
3:45 a.m.

He testified that when he had arrived at her

apartment, "Barney Miller" was on the television.

In rebuttal,

the State called a television company executive who testified
that "Barney Miller" was not on television at all during the
night in question.

The court explained:

It is perfectly clear that the rebuttal
evidence did naught but impeach the
credibility of appellant, who had sought to
embellish his ability to recall by reciting a
fact related to his recollection of time and
place. It did not go to prove that appellant
was not present at the time and place he
intended to establish by his alibi. It
simply indicated that his memory of what
occurred at that place at an earlier time was
faulty.
Id. at 670.
The testimony of Miller in this case was also limited
to the issue of Davis' credibility concerning the route taken in
the canyons.

Miller did not testify that he had seen defendant

somewhere else, which may have required extensive investigation
-30-

and surrebuttal testimony.

He simply informed the jury that the

road between the two canyons was inaccessible on that day.

The

testimony implied that Ms. Davis' recall of when she and
defendant drove into the canyon or where they had driven was
inaccurate, not that they had not been driving together.
Additionally, the State did not spring this surprise
testimony on defendant as seems to have been the case in
Williams, but apprised defendant of the possible testimony as
soon as it was discovered/ thus, complying with the statutory
requirement that "the defendant and prosecuting attorney shall be
under a continuing duty to disclose the names and addresses of
additional witnesses which come to the attention of either party
after filing their alibi witness lists."

Utah Code Ann. S 77-14-

2(2)(1982).
In State v. Madera, 670 P.2d 552 (Mont. 1983) the
defendant also claimed that the district court erred in allowing
surprise rebuttal testimony in violation of the statute which
required prior notice of such witnesses. After finding that the
State had no way of knowing what the alibi witness would reveal
in his testimony, and that the defendant was given an opportunity
to question the witness before the rebuttal testimony (which
offer defense counsel refused), the court allowed the testimony.
On appeal in that case, as in the present matter, the State
claimed that it gave notice of the witness at the earliest
practicable time, and the defendant claimed he was denied due
process and cited to Wardius.

The court found that good cause

had been shown due to the evidentiary developments during trial
to allow the State to add to its rebuttal list.

Further, the Madera court ruled that "If surprise is
claimed by the other party, the proper procedure when unrevealed
witnessed are added is to ask for a continuance so that
preparation may be made." 670 P.2d at 556. As in that case,
defendant here failed to request a continuance.

Defendant was

well aware of this option, as is evidenced in the statement, "If
we locate this person and if he's relevant as a rebuttal witness,
which I have no idea of knowing how he would be at this point,
then I would need a further continuance to interview him and then
to find rebuttal witnesses—surrebuttal, if necessary, because
it's a complete surprise, anything that he will say at this time"
(T. 116). However, when the witness had been procured and his
potential testimony revealed, defendant did not request a
continuance, and even argued that "It's not a crucial issue to
this case that he should be allowed to put on because some great
prejudice will accrue to the State if he doesn't" (T. 123), (See
also T. 118, 122). Defendant should not now be allowed to decide
that the issue was indeed crucial to him and benefit thereby when
counsel affirmatively determined not to request a continuance.
This Court has previously noted that failure to request
a continuance when surprise is claimed as grounds for excluding a
witness tends to negate the claim of surprise.
734 P.2d 913, n.6 (Utah 1987).

State v. Knight,

While Knight resulted in reversal

for failure to provide timely discovery, it is distinguishable
from this case*

In Knight, counsel requested a continuance to

meet the surprise testimony but it was denied.

Further, the

prosecutor had told defense counsel only 3 days prior to trial

that he could not locate the witnesses and knew, when he did
locate them, that defense counsel was interested in talking with
them.

In this case, the prosecutor did not know of the existence

of the witness or his usefulness until the time of his request
for a continuance to locate the witness.

Because defendant did

not request a continuance and the prosecutor did not withhold
information from him, the trial court properly admitted the
evidence over defendant's objection.

See also LaMere v. Risley,

827 F.2d 622, 625 (9th Cir. 1987) citing United States v. Krohn,
558 F.2d 390, 394 (8th Cir.) (defendant's failure to ask for
continuance undermines his claim of unfair surprise), cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 868, 98 S.Ct. 207, 54 L.Ed.2d 145 (1977).
The prosecutor provided defendant with the name and
substance of testimony of the rebuttal witness as soon as he
discovered the witness' existence.

He explained that he did not

know he could attack Davis' credibility on this issue until she
testified.

Even defense counsel admitted that she had not

previously thought of this angle (T. 122). Defendant neglected
to request a continuance, although claiming that the witness was
a surprise and that defendant was unprepared to adequately
respond to the possible testimony.

In the face of the State's

compliance and defendant's lack of action, defendant should not
now be allowed to claim a violation of due process for failure to
exclude the evidence where defense counsel attempted to exclude
it?by arguing that it was not crucial.
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CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing arguments, the State
respectfully requests that the Court affirm defendant's
convictions.
DATED this

9^

day of March, 1989,
R. PAUL VAN DAM
Attorney General
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